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5.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 5.9
percent four quarters hence.
As we approach the end of 2002, the economy
appears to have performed about as expected: If
real GDP grows at about a 1¼ percent annual rate
in the fourth quarter, and CPI inflation is about
2¼ percent at an annual rate for the quarter, as
projected in the December 10 issue of the Blue
Chip Economic Indicators, then economic growth
in 2002 will be 2.9 percent, inflation will be 2.2
percent, and the unemployment rate will proba-
bly average about 5.9 percent. In the forecasting
business, last year’s projections are tantamount
to hitting a bull’s-eye.
If the economy is performing about as forecast,
why are so many so glum these days? Part of the
story is that forecasters were right for the annual
average but wrong on the pattern over the year.
At this time last year, policymakers and business
leaders alike were struggling with the economic
uncertainties associated with the fallout from
the horrific events of September 11. The general
expectation was that the economy would contract
in the fourth quarter of last year and that economic
growth in the first quarter of this year would be
only a touch above zero. Then, the consensus
view was, as the 9/11 shock wore off and as the
expansionist policies put in place by the Fed
and Congress took hold, the economy would be
growing at about a 4 percent pace by the third
and fourth quarters of this year.
Actual events have played out a bit differently.
After growing at a 2.7 percent annual rate in the
fourth quarter of 2001, real GDP surged to a 5
percent growth rate in the first quarter of 2002.
Those two pretty strong quarters were certainly a
surprise in the wake of 9/11. The economy then
I
t is a pleasure to participate once again in
an AAIM program. The end of the year is
a traditional time to take stock of the state
of the economy and its likely future course,
and that is what I’ll do this morning.
The title of today’s program, “The American
Economy and Middle East Situation,” presents
considerable challenges. I’ll talk about the
“American Economy”—actually, the U.S. economy
part of the topic. That is the easy part, and I’ll
leave the tough Middle East issues to others.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, especially
Kevin Kliesen, for their assistance and comments,
but I retain full responsibility for errors.
My basic message today is that, while the
economy is still working through some adverse
developments that affected our economic perform-
ance over the past couple of years, it has displayed
an extraordinary resiliency. The economy is funda-
mentally sound; our underlying economic strength
has carried us through some difficult times.
REVIEW OF 2002
At this time last year, the consensus view
among forecasters was that the economy, as meas-
ured by real gross domestic product (GDP), would
grow by about 2¾ percent in 2002 and that the
consumer price index (CPI) would increase a
shade over 2 percent. With below-trend economic
growth expected to prevail for most of the year,
the unemployment rate was projected to rise fromslowed appreciably during the second quarter, to
a 1.3 percent rate, and accelerated again during
the third quarter, to a 4 percent rate. Smoothing
through this volatility shows that real GDP has
grown at a bit less than 3.5 percent at an annual
rate over the first three quarters of this year—
which is pretty close to the economy’s potential
rate of growth. The soft patch in the fourth quar-
ter finishes this year on a down note, and that is
part of the story of why so many are so glum.
Consumer spending has accounted for about
two-thirds of real GDP growth over the first three
quarters of this year. Much of this strength reflects
elevated sales rates of new light vehicles, the
slower pace of sales in October and November
notwithstanding. The two other sources of
strength this year have been from a slower draw-
down of business inventories and government
gross investment and consumption expenditures.
The latter, obviously, reflects the initial response
to 9/11 events and the associated war on terrorism.
The expected slower rate of GDP growth in
the current quarter reflects a projected decline in
automotive output that could reduce GDP growth
by more than 1 percentage point. The choppiness
caused by the ups and downs of auto production
and inventory investment is not a matter of funda-
mental concern. Indeed, some of the choppiness
may well disappear in the future as revisions to
seasonal factors tend to smooth short-run
fluctuations.
Putting aside the extraordinary 9/11 tragedy,
if that is possible, what do we make of the current
recovery from the recession of 2001? The NBER
Business Cycle Dating Committee has not yet
announced officially that the recession is over
but, assuming that the recovery began late last
year or early this year, 2002 will have been one
of the slowest economic recoveries in the post-
World War II period. During the first four quarters
of the average post-World War II recovery, real
GDP increased by a little less than 7½ percent.
In a typical recovery, the key drivers of growth
are new private home construction (residential
fixed investment); household expenditures on
durable goods, like motor vehicles, furniture and
home furnishings; and business spending on
plants, equipment, and software. This recovery
has been unusual because these sources of strength
have been much weaker than usual, resulting in
below average growth.
The 2002 recovery has also been unlike the
typical recovery in that equity prices have con-
tinued to be weak, which may be part of the reason
that demand growth has been modest. All else
equal, rising stock prices increase consumer
wealth, leading consumers to increase their pur-
chases by more than their income growth. For
business, rising stock prices spur equity issue,
which is used to finance investment in plant and
equipment. When equity prices fall, the opposite
effects occur. Ultimately, stock prices rise or fall
because profits rise or fall. This year’s poor stock
market performance is readily explained by this
year’s dim profit performance: As reported by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, after-tax economic
profits are down about 13 percent over the first
three quarters of 2002.
Another reason for the weak business invest-
ment in 2002 may be related to the extraordinary
rates of capital investment seen during the latter
part of the 1991-2001 business expansion; the
capital stock in a number of industries got ahead
of demand. But most fundamentally, the modest
recovery reflects the modest nature of the recession
of 2001. The fact that the economy never sank very
far means that there wasn’t much of a bounce back
in the cards anyway. Most noteworthy in this
regard is the steady strength of housing demand.
Housing construction usually declines substan-
tially during a recession, and then bounces back
during the recovery phase of the cycle. This time,
housing was strong through the recession and
continued on a high plateau during the recovery.
Housing growth was modest because the industry
operated at a high level all along.
Nevertheless, the year does seem to be ending
on a disappointing down note, and that is part of
the reason many are glum. Perhaps a more impor-
tant source of gloom is that employment growth
has been essentially zero. But the flip side of the
employment story is the remarkable surge in
productivity growth. This topic is so interesting
that it deserves some elaboration.
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One of the most noteworthy features of this
recovery is the weak demand for labor. In fact,
the labor market performance this year bears an
eerie similarity to the so-called “jobless recovery”
after the 1990-91 recession. In the first year of
both recoveries, growth of nonfarm payrolls from
the cyclical trough was negative and the unem-
ployment rate was modestly higher.
At one level, the reluctance of firms to vigor-
ously compete for labor in today’s economy
reflects the modest growth of output and aggregate
demand. Yet at another level, firms may be reluc-
tant to boost employment during this recovery
because they have found ways to meet demand
through improved production processes. Pro-
ductivity growth—the growth of output per hour
of labor input—has this year been considerably
higher than what is normal.
To be more specific, the growth of labor pro-
ductivity over the first year of the last four recov-
eries (excluding the short 1980-81 recovery)
averaged about 4¼ percent. Assuming that the
2001 recession ended sometime during the last
quarter of 2001, growth of labor productivity over
the first three quarters of 2002 has been nearly 1
percentage point faster. A crude back-of-the enve-
lope calculation shows that this extra 1 percent-
age point of labor productivity growth over the
first three quarters of 2002 has effectively been
substituted for a net job creation of a little more
than 2 million workers, which would have
occurred had the average job growth of the past
four recoveries held. In fact, 2 million may be
too low, since the average job growth includes
the 1990-91 jobless recovery.
In no way do I mean to imply that this extra
1 percentage point of productivity growth during
the 2002 recovery has been bad for the economy.
Strong productivity growth entails far more ben-
efits than costs. Indeed the long-term benefits of,
say, 3 percent productivity growth versus 2 per-
cent productivity growth are huge. The problem
is not that productivity growth is too high but
that GDP growth is too low to create satisfactory
employment growth.
In the short-run, firms have been able to sub-
stitute capital for labor because of the tremendous
rates of capital investment they made during the
1990s and the application of improved business
practices that are coming closer to realizing the
full potential of the enlarged capital stock. What
really matters is not that a PC replaces a typewriter
but that the PC makes possible changes in busi-
ness practice that squeeze more output from each
hour of labor input. This very speech is a simple
example: Based on an outline I sent by email,
Kevin Kliesen drafted it and I put it into my own
style working on a computer at the St. Louis Fed
branch in Louisville, with the assistance of com-
ments Bob Rasche sent me by fax.
Recent research by experts in this field sug-
gests that a reasonable estimate of long-term
U.S. labor productivity growth going forward is
between 2 and 3 percent.1 If so, then productivity
growth will be significantly higher than it was
from 1973 to 1995, when U.S. productivity growth
averaged about 1.4 percent per year.
Of course, there is always the possibility that
some part of the recent surge in productivity
growth will be revised away. For policymakers,
one of the difficulties in discerning the trend rate
of productivity growth stems from revisions to the
data, which can sometimes be quite substantial.
For example, the 1998 and 1999 annual revisions
indicated that productivity growth was noticeably
faster than originally thought. Conversely, the
2001 and 2002 revisions significantly lowered
estimates of productivity growth. During these
periods, revisions to output growth were the
driving factor, as hours were hardly revised.
Some preliminary research at the St. Louis
Fed shows that, since 1985, there has been little
correlation between the initial productivity figures
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
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1 Jorgenson, Dale W.; Ho, Mun S. and Stiroh, Kevin J. “Projecting Productivity Growth: Lessons from the U.S. Growth Resurgence;” and
Oliner, Stephen D. and Sichel, Daniel E. “Information Technology and Productivity: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?” Both in
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Third quarter, 2002.final figures that incorporate annual revisions.
For example, if the initial published productivity
growth rate is 2 percent, an approximate 95 per-
cent confidence interval for the final revised figure
is 0 to 4 percent, a huge range. For this reason,
I’m hesitant to put too much emphasis on this
year’s strong productivity numbers. Knowing
this history, I don’t want to go out on a policy
limb, or any other limb, based on the early esti-
mates of productivity growth.
That said, this year’s numbers are consistent
with an evolving upward trend in labor produc-
tivity growth, and they are consistent with anec-
dotal information from talking with business
leaders. I don’t want to get bogged down in the
details, but the experts suggest that a large per-
centage of this acceleration is IT related—both
quantitatively and qualitatively. From a quanti-
tative standpoint, there was a surge in business
capital spending over the past several years: Real
investment in equipment and software as a share
of real GDP effectively doubled to 6 percent from
1995:Q1 to 2002:Q3.
While the tremendous increases in physical
volumes of capital goods have been important,
so has the qualitative aspect of these capital goods.
Qualitatively, the new technologies embodied in
these computers, servers, telecommunications
equipment, and the like has also enabled firms
toproducemorewithless.Atsomepoint,though, as
aggregate demand growth starts to pick up and
firms, responding in kind, begin to raise the pace
of their hiring, the current exceptionally high
rates of productivity growth will slow to rates
approximating their long-term trend. The capital-
labor trade off may be more permanent in some
industries than others, but in the aggregate the
faster rate of growth of living standards enabled
by enhanced rates of productivity growth is unam-
biguously a net plus for the economy.
OUTLOOK FOR 2003-04
I’ll now turn to the outlook for the U.S. econ-
omy over the next year or two. Inherent in any
forecast of the future are many leaps of faith. In
my mind two stand out. First, any forecast that is
generated from a macroeconometric model pre-
sumes that economic outcomes are tied together
in a certain fashion. A model’s structure reflects
both the theoretical biases of the forecaster and
the historical regularities in the data. Clearly, the
theory can be wrong or incomplete, and the inter-
pretation of the data flawed.
The second key assumption, or leap of faith,
that forecasters have to make concerns the likely
path of economic variables in the model. Key
assumptions in this regard are the path of oil
prices, the Fed’s interest rate target, tax rates,
depreciation rates on capital goods, foreign
exchange rates and—sigh—the course of the
stock market. Clearly, a forecast depends on a
number of factors that may change unexpectedly—
9/11 is a perfect example of an important but
inherently unforecastable event. With that in
mind, let me walk you through a scenario that
seems credible knowing what we know now.
When thinking about the outlook, I am always
well aware that the only sensible stance for me is
to be an informed consumer of forecasts. I am
not myself an expert forecaster, and do not—can-
not—spend enough time forecasting to expect to
outperform those who make a living from that
occupation. I am well aware of the range of fore-
casts—expert forecasters disagree. Research sug-
gests that the best forecast for a consumer like me
is some sort of average of the range of forecasts.
For these reasons, I place a great deal of
weight on the so-called consensus forecast pub-
lished in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators.
Each month, about 50 of the nation’s top private
sector forecasters are polled on their outlook for
several key economic indicators (e.g., growth of
real GDP, the CPI, industrial production and the
level of the unemployment rate) over the next
several quarters. The consensus is just the average
of these individual forecasts. However, and this
is an important point, I am always impressed by
how quickly the consensus forecast can change.
I am not willing to bet my house—or my policy
position—on the forecast. Experts differ, and over
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forecasts significantly.
With that introduction, I’ll offer an overview
of the consensus forecast for the U.S. economy.
First, it seems likely that the growth of consump-
tion—that is, spending by households on durable
and nondurable goods, and services—will remain
around 3 percent, which is modestly slower than
the growth seen during the latter part of the 1990s
(and even over the past four quarters). Although
strong growth of labor productivity will continue
to undergird household incomes, current saving
rates seem abnormally low in light of the pending
demographic challenges associated with the
retirement of the baby-boom generation. Ulti-
mately, some rebalancing of spending relative to
incomes seems necessary—though this process
could play out over several years. In addition,
some of the factors that have boosted consump-
tion in recent years—rapid growth of household
wealth, mortgage refinancing, and mortgage cash-
outs are not likely to be the source of extra spend-
ing that they were a few years back. In short,
consumption growth is likely to be a solid 3
percent, more or less, but to lag income growth
slightly as households return the saving ratio to
a more normal level.
Second, whether near-term real GDP growth
is faster or slower than the consensus expects will
depend crucially on business outlays for capital
goods. At present, a majority of forecasters expect
the pace of fixed investment to be stronger dur-
ing the second half of 2003. This outlook is also
consistent with a couple of recent surveys of
firms published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia and the Institute for Supply Manage-
ment. However, the timing of the recovery in fixed
investment is very uncertain, owing to some key
factors. These include current low rates of capac-
ity utilization, due to the high rate of investment
in the late-1990s; relatively high vacancy rates in
commercial and industrial buildings; a guarded
outlook for corporate profits; uncertainties associ-
ated with a possible war with Iraq; and the threat
of future terrorist attacks occurring on U.S. soil
or affecting U.S. interests abroad.
I’ve offered a formidable list of factors hold-
ing back investment in 2003, but there are also
reasons to be optimistic about the pace of capital
spending. First and foremost, high-tech capital
depreciates rapidly. Hence, fairly rapid growth
of high-technology investment—an increasing
share of investment spending—is needed to keep
net investment rates stable or growing. Replace-
ment investment is important when standard
practice is, for example, to depreciate a PC over
three years. Second, business planning could
become appreciably less challenging once geo-
political uncertainties are resolved. And if the
uncertainties are not resolved, from my experi-
ence, what happens is that businesses learn to
live with the problems and get on with their pur-
suit of new products and new markets. Indeed, if
we can use the stock market as a barometer, it
appears that some uncertainty has been whittled
away of late, as equity markets have rallied mod-
estly since setting five-year lows in early October.
Finally, economic activity should continue to be
boosted by an accommodative stance of monetary
policy, with some assistance from fiscal policy.
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE
LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
Given the uncertainties I’ve noted above, the
timing of the transition to higher growth remains
unclear, but probably not the eventual outcome.
To believe otherwise implies an alternative view
that something is structurally unsound in our
economy—either much weaker economic growth
is likely, or inflation is poised to accelerate. At
this point, I’m willing to place my marker on the
side of those who point to flexible markets, rapid
innovation, high productivity growth, and low
inflation as the linchpins for a return to solid
economic growth over the medium term.
Too often, though, observers of the economic
scene get caught up in the high-frequency data
and neglect longer-term issues. The central bank’s
primary input to the mix of conditions that pro-
motes high growth in employment and output is
to pursue policies that maximize prospects for
low and stable inflation. The evidence is that the
Federal Reserve has been successful in this regard.
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inflation rates expected by financial markets,
consumers, and forecasters give no credibility to
the assertion that the inflation outlook is poised
to deteriorate anytime soon—either on the upside
or on the downside.
That said, the current situation is not one in
which monetary policymakers can afford to relax.
Monetary policy is very accommodative right
now. Short-term interest rates are exceptionally
low and money growth is strong. Given the down-
ward pressures that have slowed the economy’s
recovery, this stance has been appropriate. As I
have emphasized on several occasions, this policy
stance has been possible because the Fed’s credi-
bility is high. The markets believe that the Fed
will reverse course when necessary to prevent
inflation from rising, and I’ll certainly do every-
thing I know to do to assure that outcome.
Having made this point, I do not want to be
read as hinting that I’m currently on the edge of
pushing for a tighter policy. The objective is sus-
tained low and stable inflation; given all the short-
term economic negatives I’ve discussed, the Fed
needs to be alert to deflationary as well as infla-
tionary dangers in the months ahead. If necessary,
there is room to cut the federal funds rate target
some more, and to pursue other policies if we run
out of room on the funds rate policy instrument.
I think it is unlikely that we’ll run into that prob-
lem, but thinking through every possible contin-
gency is what creates a robust and competent
monetary policy. In short, monetary policy
changes in the future will be driven, as they
have in the past, by arrival of new information
on how inflation prospects and growth prospects
are evolving.
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